Civil Code § 51.12. Senior Housing in Riverside County; Exceptions

California Civil Code  >  Civil Code §51.12. Senior Housing in Riverside County; Exceptions
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that the requirements for senior housing under Sections 51.10 and 51.11 are more stringent than the requirements for that housing under the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-430).
(b) Any person who resided in, occupied, or used, prior to January 1, 1990, a dwelling in a senior citizen housing development which relied on the exemption to the special design requirement provided by Section 51.4 as that section read prior to January 1, 2001, shall not be deprived of the right to continue that residency, or occupancy, or use as the result of the changes made to this section by the enactment of Senate Bill 1382 or Senate Bill 2011 at the 1999-2000 Regular Session of the Legislature.
(c) This section shall only apply to the County of Riverside. [2000]

Civil Code § 51.10. Age Discrimination in Housing Sales or Rentals in Riverside County

California Civil Code  >  Civil Code §51.10. Age Discrimination in Housing Sales or Rentals in Riverside County
(a) Section 51 shall be construed to prohibit a business establishment from discriminating in the sale or rental of housing based upon age. A business establishment may establish and preserve housing for senior citizens, pursuant to Section 51.11, except housing as to which Section 51.11 is preempted by the prohibition in the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-430) and implementing regulations against discrimination on the basis of familial status.
(b) This section is intended to clarify the holdings in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, and O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Association (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790.
(c) Selection preferences based on age, imposed in connection with a federally approved housing program, do not constitute age discrimination in housing.
(d) This section shall only apply to the County of Riverside. [2010]

Civil Code § 51.11. Senior Citizen Housing in Riverside County

California Civil Code  >  Civil Code §51.11. Senior Citizen Housing in Riverside County
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that this section is essential to establish and preserve housing for senior citizens. There are senior citizens who need special living environments, and find that there is an inadequate supply of this type of housing in the state.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
  (1) “Qualifying resident” or “senior citizen” means a person 62 years of age or older, or 55 years of age or older in a senior citizen housing development.
  (2) “Qualified permanent resident” means a person who meets both of the following requirements:
   (A) Was residing with the qualifying resident or senior citizen prior to the death, hospitalization, or other prolonged absence of, or the dissolution of marriage with, the qualifying resident or senior citizen.
   (B) Was 45 years of age or older, or was a spouse, co-habitant, or person providing primary physical or economic support to the qualifying resident or senior citizen.
  (3) “Qualified permanent resident” also means a disabled person or person with a disabling illness or injury who is a child or grandchild of the senior citizen or a qualified permanent resident as defined in paragraph (2) who needs to live with the senior citizen or qualified permanent resident because of the disabling condition, illness, or injury. For purposes of this section, “disabled” means a person who has a disability as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 54. A “disabling injury or illness” means an illness or injury which results in a condition meeting the definition of disability set forth in subdivision (b) of Section 54.
   (A) For any person who is a qualified permanent resident under paragraph (3) whose disabling condition ends, the owner, board of directors, or other governing body may require the formerly disabled resident to cease residing in the development upon receipt of six months’ written notice; provided, however, that the owner, board of directors, or other governing body may allow the person to remain a resident for up to one year, after the disabling condition ends.
   (B) The owner, board of directors, or other governing body of the senior citizen housing development may take action to prohibit or terminate occupancy by a person who is a qualified permanent resident under paragraph (3) if the owner, board of directors, or other governing body finds, based on credible and objective evidence, that the person is likely to pose a significant threat to the health or safety of others that cannot be ameliorated by means of a reasonable accommodation; provided, however, that action to prohibit or terminate the occupancy may be taken only after doing both of the following:
    (i) Providing reasonable notice to and an opportunity to be heard for the disabled person whose occupancy is being challenged, and reasonable notice to the co-resident parent or grandparent of that person.
    (ii) Giving due consideration to the relevant, credible, and objective information provided in that hearing. The evidence shall be taken and held in a confidential manner, pursuant to a closed session, by the owner, board of directors, or other governing body in order to preserve the privacy of the affected persons.
     The affected persons shall be entitled to have present at the hearing an attorney or any other person authorized by them to speak on their behalf or to assist them in the matter.
  (4) “Senior citizen housing development” means a residential development developed with more than 20 units as a senior community by its developer and zoned as a senior community by a local governmental entity, or characterized as a senior community in its governing documents, as these are defined in Section 4150, or qualified as a senior community under the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, as amended. Any senior citizen housing development which is required to obtain a public report under Section 11010 of the Business and Professions Code and which submits its application for a public report after July 1, 2001, shall be required to have been issued a public report as a senior citizen housing development under Section 11010.05 of the Business and Professions Code.
  (5) “Dwelling unit” or “housing” means any residential accommodation other than a mobilehome.
  (6) “Cohabitant” refers to persons who live together as spouses or persons who are domestic partners within the meaning of Section 297 of the Family Code.
  (7) “Permitted health care resident” means a person hired to provide live-in, long-term, or terminal health care to a qualifying resident, or a family member of the qualifying resident providing that care. For the purposes of this section, the care provided by a permitted health care resident must be substantial in nature and must provide either assistance with necessary daily activities or medical treatment, or both.
   A permitted health care resident shall be entitled to continue his or her occupancy, residency, or use of the dwelling unit as a permitted resident in the absence of the senior citizen from the dwelling unit only if both of the following are applicable:
   (A) The senior citizen became absent from the dwelling unit due to hospitalization or other necessary medical treatment and expects to return to his or her residence within 90 days from the date the absence began.
   (B) The absent senior citizen or an authorized person acting for the senior citizen submits a written request to the owner, board of directors, or governing board stating that the senior citizen desires that the permitted health care resident be allowed to remain in order to be present when the senior citizen returns to reside in the development.
    Upon written request by the senior citizen or an authorized person acting for the senior citizen, the owner, board of directors, or governing board shall have the discretion to allow a permitted health care resident to remain for a time period longer than 90 days from the date that the senior citizen’s absence began, if it appears that the senior citizen will return within a period of time not to exceed an additional 90 days.
 (c) The covenants, conditions, and restrictions and other documents or written policy shall set forth the limitations on occupancy, residency, or use on the basis of age. Any limitation shall not be more exclusive than to require that one person in residence in each dwelling unit may be required to be a senior citizen and that each other resident in the same dwelling unit may be required to be a qualified permanent resident, a permitted health care resident, or a person under 55 years of age whose occupancy is permitted under subdivision (g) of this section or subdivision (b) of Section 51.12. That limitation may be less exclusive, but shall at least require that the persons commencing any occupancy of a dwelling unit include a senior citizen who intends to reside in the unit as his or her primary residence on a permanent basis. The application of the rules set forth in this subdivision regarding limitations on occupancy may result in less than all of the dwellings being actually occupied by a senior citizen.
 (d) The covenants, conditions, and restrictions or other documents or written policy shall permit temporary residency, as a guest of a senior citizen or qualified permanent resident, by a person of less than 55 years of age for periods of time, not more than 60 days in any year, that are specified in the covenants, conditions, and restrictions or other documents or written policy.
 (e) Upon the death or dissolution of marriage, or upon hospitalization, or other prolonged absence of the qualifying resident, any qualified permanent resident shall be entitled to continue his or her occupancy, residency, or use of the dwelling unit as a permitted resident. This subdivision shall not apply to a permitted health care resident.
 (f) The covenants, conditions, and restrictions or other documents or written policies applicable to any condominium, stock cooperative, limited-equity housing cooperative, planned development, or multiple-family residential property that contained age restrictions on January 1, 1984, shall be enforceable only to the extent permitted by this section, notwithstanding lower age restrictions contained in those documents or policies.
 (g) Any person who has the right to reside in, occupy, or use the housing or an unimproved lot subject to this section on or after January 1, 1985, shall not be deprived of the right to continue that residency, occupancy, or use as the result of the enactment of this section by Chapter 1147 of the Statutes of 1996.
 (h) A housing development may qualify as a senior citizen housing development under this section even though, as of January 1, 1997, it does not meet the definition of a senior citizen housing development specified in subdivision (b), if the development complies with that definition for every unit that becomes occupied after January 1, 1997, and if the development was once within that definition, and then became noncompliant with the definition as the result of any one of the following:
  (1) The development was ordered by a court or a local, state, or federal enforcement agency to allow persons other than qualifying residents, qualified permanent residents, or permitted health care residents to reside in the development.
  (2) The development received a notice of a pending or proposed action in, or by, a court, or a local, state, or federal enforcement agency, which action could have resulted in the development being ordered by a court or a state or federal enforcement agency to allow persons other than qualifying residents, qualified permanent residents, or permitted health care residents to reside in the development.
  (3) The development agreed to allow persons other than qualifying residents, qualified permanent residents, or permitted health care residents to reside in the development by entering into a stipulation, conciliation agreement, or settlement agreement with a local, state, or federal enforcement agency or with a private party who had filed, or indicated an intent to file, a complaint against the development with a local, state, or federal enforcement agency, or file an action in a court.
  (4) The development allowed persons other than qualifying residents, qualified permanent residents, or permitted health care residents to reside in the development on the advice of counsel in order to prevent the possibility of an action being filed by a private party or by a local, state, or federal enforcement agency.
 (i) The covenants, conditions, and restrictions or other documents or written policy of the senior citizen housing development shall permit the occupancy of a dwelling unit by a permitted health care resident during any period that the person is actually providing live-in, long-term, or hospice health care to a qualifying resident for compensation.
 (j) This section shall only apply to the County of Riverside. [2016]

Civil Code § 51.3. Senior Citizen Housing in Counties other than Riverside

California Civil Code  >  Civil Code §51.3. Senior Citizen Housing in Counties other than Riverside
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that this section is essential to establish and preserve specially designed accessible housing for senior citizens. There are senior citizens who need special living environments and services, and find that there is an inadequate supply of this type of housing in the state.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
  (1) “Qualifying resident” or “senior citizen” means a person 62 years of age or older, or 55 years of age or older in a senior citizen housing development.
  (2) “Qualified permanent resident” means a person who meets both of the following requirements:
   (A) Was residing with the qualifying resident or senior citizen prior to the death, hospitalization, or other prolonged absence of, or the dissolution of marriage with, the qualifying resident or senior citizen.
   (B) Was 45 years of age or older, or was a spouse, cohabitant, or person providing primary physical or economic support to the qualifying resident or senior citizen.
  (3) “Qualified permanent resident” also means a disabled person or person with a disabling illness or injury who is a child or grandchild of the senior citizen or a qualified permanent resident as defined in paragraph (2) who needs to live with the senior citizen or qualified permanent resident because of the disabling condition, illness, or injury. For purposes of this section, “disabled” means a person who has a disability as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 54. A “disabling injury or illness” means an illness or injury which results in a condition meeting the definition of disability set forth in subdivision (b) of Section 54.
   (A) For any person who is a qualified permanent resident under this paragraph whose disabling condition ends, the owner, board of directors, or other governing body may require the formerly disabled resident to cease residing in the development upon receipt of six months’ written notice; provided, however, that the owner, board of directors, or other governing body may allow the person to remain a resident for up to one year after the disabling condition ends.
   (B) The owner, board of directors, or other governing body of the senior citizen housing development may take action to prohibit or terminate occupancy by a person who is a qualified permanent resident under this paragraph if the owner, board of directors, or other governing body finds, based on credible and objective evidence, that the person is likely to pose a significant threat to the health or safety of others that cannot be ameliorated by means of a reasonable accommodation; provided, however, that the action to prohibit or terminate the occupancy may be taken only after doing both of the following:
    (i) Providing reasonable notice to and an opportunity to be heard for the disabled person whose occupancy is being challenged, and reasonable notice to the coresident parent or grandparent of that person.
    (ii) Giving due consideration to the relevant, credible, and objective information provided in the hearing. The evidence shall be taken and held in a confidential manner, pursuant to a closed session, by the owner, board of directors, or other governing body in order to preserve the privacy of the affected persons.
    The affected persons shall be entitled to have present at the hearing an attorney or any other person authorized by them to speak on their behalf or to assist them in the matter.
  (4) “Senior citizen housing development” means a residential development developed, substantially rehabilitated, or substantially renovated for, senior citizens that has at least 35 dwelling units. Any senior citizen housing development which is required to obtain a public report under Section 11010 of the Business and Professions Code and which submits its application for a public report after July 1, 2001, shall be required to have been issued a public report as a senior citizen housing development under Section 11010.05 of the Business and Professions Code. No housing development constructed prior to January 1, 1985, shall fail to qualify as a senior citizen housing development because it was not originally developed or put to use for occupancy by senior citizens.
  (5) “Dwelling unit” or “housing” means any residential accommodation other than a mobilehome.
  (6) “Cohabitant” refers to persons who live together as spouses or persons who are domestic partners within the meaning of Section 297 of the Family Code.
  (7) “Permitted health care resident” means a person hired to provide live-in, long-term, or terminal health care to a qualifying resident, or a family member of the qualifying resident providing that care. For the purposes of this section, the care provided by a permitted health care resident must be substantial in nature and must provide either assistance with necessary daily activities or medical treatment, or both.
   A permitted health care resident shall be entitled to continue his or her occupancy, residency, or use of the dwelling unit as a permitted resident in the absence of the senior citizen from the dwelling unit only if both of the following are applicable:
   (A) The senior citizen became absent from the dwelling unit due to hospitalization or other necessary medical treatment and expects to return to his or her residence within 90 days from the date the absence began.
   (B) The absent senior citizen or an authorized person acting for the senior citizen submits a written request to the owner, board of directors, or governing board stating that the senior citizen desires that the permitted health care resident be allowed to remain in order to be present when the senior citizen returns to reside in the development.
    Upon written request by the senior citizen or an authorized person acting for the senior citizen, the owner, board of directors, or governing board shall have the discretion to allow a permitted health care resident to remain for a time period longer than 90 days from the date that the senior citizen’s absence began, if it appears that the senior citizen will return within a period of time not to exceed an additional 90 days.
 (c) The covenants, conditions, and restrictions and other documents or written policy shall set forth the limitations on occupancy, residency, or use on the basis of age. Any such limitation shall not be more exclusive than to require that one person in residence in each dwelling unit may be required to be a senior citizen and that each other resident in the same dwelling unit may be required to be a qualified permanent resident, a permitted health care resident, or a person under 55 years of age whose occupancy is permitted under subdivision (h) of this section or under subdivision (b) of Section 51.4. That limitation may be less exclusive, but shall at least require that the persons commencing any occupancy of a dwelling unit include a senior citizen who intends to reside in the unit as his or her primary residence on a permanent basis. The application of the rules set forth in this subdivision regarding limitations on occupancy may result in less than all of the dwellings being actually occupied by a senior citizen.
 (d) The covenants, conditions, and restrictions or other documents or written policy shall permit temporary residency, as a guest of a senior citizen or qualified permanent resident, by a person of less than 55 years of age for periods of time, not less than 60 days in any year, that are specified in the covenants, conditions, and restrictions or other documents or written policy.
 (e) Upon the death or dissolution of marriage, or upon hospitalization, or other prolonged absence of the qualifying resident, any qualified permanent resident shall be entitled to continue his or her occupancy, residency, or use of the dwelling unit as a permitted resident. This subdivision shall not apply to a permitted health care resident.
 (f) The condominium, stock cooperative, limited-equity housing cooperative, planned development, or multiple-family residential rental property shall have been developed for, and initially been put to use as, housing for senior citizens, or shall have been substantially rehabilitated or renovated for, and immediately afterward put to use as, housing for senior citizens, as provided in this section; provided, however, that no housing development constructed prior to January 1, 1985, shall fail to qualify as a senior citizen housing development because it was not originally developed for or originally put to use for occupancy by senior citizens.
 (g) The covenants, conditions, and restrictions or other documents or written policies applicable to any condominium, stock cooperative,  limited-equity housing cooperative, planned development, or multiple-family residential property that contained age restrictions on January 1, 1984, shall be enforceable only to the extent permitted by this section, notwithstanding lower age restrictions contained in those documents or policies.
 (h) Any person who has the right to reside in, occupy, or use the housing or an unimproved lot subject to this section on January 1, 1985, shall not be deprived of the right to continue that residency, occupancy, or use as the result of the enactment of this section.
 (i) The covenants, conditions, and restrictions or other documents or written policy of the senior citizen housing development shall permit the occupancy of a dwelling unit by a permitted health care resident during any period that the person is actually providing live-in, long-term, or hospice health care to a qualifying resident for compensation. For purposes of this subdivision, the term “for compensation” shall include provisions of lodging and food in exchange for care.
 (j) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, this section shall not apply to the County of Riverside. [2016]

Civil Code § 51.4. Senior Housing in Counties other than Riverside; Exceptions

California Civil Code  >  Civil Code §51.4. Senior Housing in Counties other than Riverside; Exceptions
(a) The Legislature finds and declares that the requirements for senior housing under Sections 51.2 and 51.3 are more stringent than the requirements for that housing under the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (P. L. 100-430) in recognition of the acute shortage of housing for families with children in California. The Legislature further finds and declares that the special design requirements for senior housing under Sections 51.2 and 51.3 may pose a hardship to some housing developments that were constructed before the decision in Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal. 3d 721. The Legislature further finds and declares that the requirement for specially designed accommodations in senior housing under Section 51.2 and 51.3 provides important benefits to senior citizens and also ensures that housing exempt from the prohibition of age discrimination is carefully tailored to meet the compelling societal interest in providing senior housing.
(b) Any person who resided in, occupied, or used, prior to January 1, 1990, a dwelling in a senior citizen housing development that relied on the exemption to the special design requirement provided by this section prior to January 1, 2001, shall not be deprived of the right to continue that residency, occupancy, or use as the result of the changes made to this section by the enactment of Chapter 1004 of the Statutes of 2000.
(c) This section shall not apply to the County of Riverside. [2006]

Membership or Owner Duties Checklist

Membership or Owner Duties Checklist

Resale Disclosure Statement

Owners of residential properties must provide a completed Real Estate Transfer Disclosure Statement (“Form”) to prospective buyers before reselling residential property. This Form also must be completed by a real estate agent, if any. The Form is extensive and detailed and found in the statute. [CC §1102 et seq.; see e.g., §1102.6]

Smoke Detectors in Owner Units

Each owner must supply and install smoke detectors in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions in any dwelling intended for human occupancy. Each smoke detector must be operable at the time that any tenant occupies the dwelling unit and must be repaired if the tenant reports a problem. The association is responsible for installing, maintaining and testing smoke detectors in hallways, common stairwells, etc. [H&S Code §§13113.7 & 13113.8]

Carbon Monoxide Detectors in Owner Units

Owners must install an approved carbon monoxide detector in any single-family dwelling unit or for all other existing dwelling units intended for human occupancy. [H&S Code, §§17926-17926.2] Selling owners must disclose in the required Form whether the dwelling unit being sold has a carbon monoxide detector. [CC §1102.6]

Low-Flow Plumbing Fixtures

All single-family dwelling unit owners must replace noncompliant plumbing fixtures no later than January 1, 2014, or January 1, 2017, depending on factors specified in the statute. The date is January 1, 2019, for multi-family residential property and commercial property owners. Failure to provide proof of compliance could prevent the issuance of building permits. It is not clear if multi-family residential includes condominiums and attached planned development housing. See statute for details and disclosure duties. [CC §§1101.1 – 1101.9 and 1102.155] Flow rates of noncompliant fixtures are in CC §1101.3. It may take additional legislation for clarification on how an HOA that does not maintain, repair or replace plumbing fixtures could compel owner compliance. Selling owners must disclose in the required Form whether the dwelling unit being sold has water-conserving plumbing fixtures. [CC §1102.6]

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Health & Saf. Code §1597.45. Small Family Day Care Homes-Requirements and Limitations

California Health & Safety Code  >   Health & Saf. Code §1597.45. Small Family Day Care Homes-Requirements and Limitations

(a)  The use of a home as a small family or large family daycare home shall be considered a residential use of property and a use by right for the purposes of all local ordinances, including, but not limited to, zoning ordinances.

(b)  A local jurisdiction shall not impose a business license, fee, or tax for the privilege of operating a small or large family daycare home.

(c)  Use of a home as a small or large family daycare home shall not constitute a change of occupancy for purposes of Part 1.5 (commencing with Section 17910) of Division 13 (State Housing Law) or for purposes of local building codes.

(d)  A small or large family daycare home shall not be subject to the provisions of Division 13 (commencing with Section 21000) of the Public Resources Code.

(e) The provisions of this chapter do not preclude a city, county, or other local public entity from placing restrictions on building heights, setback, or lot dimensions of a family daycare home, as long as those restrictions are identical to those applied to all other residences with the same zoning designation as the family daycare home. This chapter does not preclude a local ordinance that deals with health and safety, building standards, environmental impact standards, or any other matter within the jurisdiction of a local public entity, as long as the local ordinance is identical to those applied to all other residences with the same zoning designation as the family daycare home. This chapter also does not prohibit or restrict the abatement of nuisances by a city, county, or city and county. However, the ordinance or nuisance abatement shall not distinguish family daycare homes from other homes with the same zoning designation, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.

(f) For purposes of this chapter, “small family daycare home or large family daycare home” includes a detached single-family dwelling, a townhouse, a dwelling unit within a dwelling, or a dwelling unit within a covered multifamily dwelling in which the underlying zoning allows for residential uses. A small family daycare home or large family daycare home is where the family daycare provider resides, and includes a dwelling or dwelling unit that is rented, leased, or owned. [2019]

Appeal Court Win Thwarts Recalled Director-Litigant’s Access to Records

In the case of Sack v. Villa Europa Homeowners Association, EG&H attorney Carrie Timko was successful in her efforts to get the Fourth District Court of Appeal to issue a writ of mandate in favor of the Association, setting aside a trial court’s order which stopped recall of a controversial director, and granted that director access to Association records. The director had a lawsuit pending against the Association for mold and water damage to her unit when she was elected to the Board of Directors. When she was unable to obtain certain documents from the Association throughdiscovery in the mold case, she decided to exercise her inspection rights as a director to access all corporate records to choose what documents would be useful in her lawsuit. When the Association refused her access, citing fiduciary and confidentiality issues, the director sought court intervention. The trial court decided that the director and her attorney could have access to corporate records, except for attorney-client privileged documents. Breach of fiduciary duty could be raised later. Before the time the Association had been ordered to provide access to the records, the membership successfully voted to recall the entire Board of Directors. The trial court stayed the effect of the recall vote until such time as the records could be produced.

Arguing on behalf of the Association, Timko filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal seeking a temporary stay and vacation of the orders. The Court of Appeal granted the writ, holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by staying the effect of the membership’s recall vote. The court found that a homeowners’ association is like a local government, and the trial court had no authority to stay a valid recall vote, which was akin to a vote enacting a valid ordinance, regulation, or other legislated item. The court also recognized that Corporations Code section 7220 regarding recall votes was amended effective January 1, 2010, to require that directors removed from office not remain on the Board until a successor has been appointed. Since the director had been validly removed from the Board before the time the Association had to allow access to corporate records pursuant to the trial court’s order, she no longer had any right to inspect the records pursuant to Corporations Codesection 8334. Therefore, both of the trial court’s orders were vacated and the directorwas not allowed access to Association records.

Duty of Landowners to Prevent Third-Party Criminal Acts

The recent case of In Yu Fang Tan v. Arnel Management Company (2nd App. Dist., Div.3, January 29, 2009) 170 Cal. App. 4th 1087 (“Yu Fang Tan”), reaffirms existing California law and provides guidance to community managers and associations regarding their duty to take steps to properly secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties.

Plaintiff Yu Fang Tan was shot at 11:30 p.m. in an attempted carjacking in the ungated portion of the common area of his apartment complex. Mr. Tan, his wife, and his son sued the management company and property owners, arguing that gates should have been installed on the entrance roadway rather than at the back of the entrance road to safeguard the parking area.

Three prior violent incidents had occurred in the apartment complex’s common area, all involving a sudden attack without warning, late at night, by a stranger on someone who was on the ungated portion of the premises. The trial court ruled that the prior violent crimes against others on the premises’ common areas were not sufficiently similar tothe one perpetrated on plaintiff to impose a duty on defendants to protect tenants of theapartment complex.  The court entered judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that three prior violent attacks by strangers in the common areas of the apartment complex were sufficiently similar to the attack on plaintiff to provide substantial evidence of the necessary degree of foreseeability to give rise to a duty on defendants to provide the “relatively minimal” security measures plaintiffs sought. The Court of Appeal found it significant that plaintiffs were not asking that defendants spend significant funds or take measures that would require ongoing surveillance or monitoring.

The scope of a landowner’s duty to provide protection from foreseeable third party criminal acts is determined by a balancing of foreseeability of the criminal acts against the burdensomeness, vagueness, and efficacy of the proposed security measures. The higher the burden to be imposed on the landowner, the higher the degree of foreseeability is required. On the other hand, where there are strong policy reasons for preventing the harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser degree of foreseeability may be required.

The sliding-scale balancing formula is defined by the California Supreme Court using the following principles: Where the burden of preventing future harm caused by third party criminal conduct is great or onerous (as when a plaintiff asserts the defendant had a legal duty to provide guards or undertake equally onerous measures, or as when a plaintiff asserts the defendant had a legal duty to provide bright lighting, activate and637649v1monitor security cameras, provide periodic “walk-throughs” by existing personnel, orprovide stronger fencing), heightened foreseeability — shown by prior similar criminal incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent criminalassaults in that location — will be required. However, where the harm can be preventedby simple means or by imposing merely minimal burdens, only “regular” reasonable foreseeability as opposed to heightened foreseeability is required.

Following this analytical approach, courts evaluating a landowner’s duty first determine the specific measures the plaintiff asserts the defendant should have taken to prevent the harm.  This defines the scope of the duty under consideration.  Second, the court analyzes how financially and socially burdensome the proposed measures would be to a landlord given the facts of the case. Third, the court identifies the nature of the thirdparty conduct that the plaintiff claims could have been prevented had the landlord taken the proposed measures, and assesses how foreseeable (from mere possibility to reasonable probability) it was that this conduct would occur.

In Yu Fang Tan, the Court of Appeal concluded that because the security measures sought by plaintiffs were not especially burdensome under the facts of the case, the trial court had erroneously required an excessively high showing of foreseeability requiring nearly identical prior crimes. The Court of Appeal emphasized that the test is prior similar incidents, not prior identical incidents. Because the plaintiffs in Yu Fang Tan asked only for relatively minimal security measures, the degree of foreseeabilityrequired was found to be “not especially high,” and the three prior incidents were sufficiently similar to make the assault on plaintiff foreseeable, and to place a duty of care on the defendants.

While Yu Fang Tan involved an apartment complex’s common area, its conclusions are equally applicable to an association’s common area. In a nutshell, the greater the degree of burden to be imposed on a landowner, the more foreseeable the criminal activity in question must be.  Prior incidents do not have to be perfectly identical to the crime being evaluated, but must be sufficiently similar to make the subject criminal activity foreseeable in order to place a duty of care on the landowner.

Given the foregoing, associations board members and community association managers would be well-served to evaluate their scope of duty by reviewing historical police reports, complaints to the police, as well as their own records, including meeting minutes, community management reports, and security service records. Please contact our office for further information should your association wish to conduct such a review.

Due Process Rights: To Each His Own (Quail Lakes v. Kozina)

In the recent case of Quail Lakes Owners Association v. Kozina (2012) 204Cal.App.4th 1132, the Third District Court of Appeal found that a single member of a community  association  cannot  assert  the  due  process  rights  of  other  association members resulting from insufficient notice of a court proceeding to obtain approval for a CC&R amendment.

In Quail Lakes, the Association filed a petition with the court for approval of an amendment to its CC&Rs in accordance with Civil Code § 1356 (“Section 1356”). Section1356 allows an association to obtain approval for an amendment to its CC&Rs with majority approval where its CC&Rs require supermajority approval.  In addition to the majority approval requirement, Section 1356 requires associations seeking a court- ordered amendment of their CC&Rs to meet other requirements, including the requirement to provide the association’s membership with 15 days notice of the court hearing on the petition.  Such notice allows members who oppose the amendment to present their objections to the court.

After failing on its first attempt to gain court approval of a CC&R amendment, the Association was allowed to file a second petition to address certain deficiencies in the first filing.  Homeowner Vladimir Kozina, who opposed the first petition, filed opposition to the second petition claiming that the Association failed to provide sufficient notice of the hearing on the petition to the membership.  Kozina’s opposition included declarations of three members who claimed to not have received sufficient notice.  The court granted the Association’s petition, and Kozina appealed.

On appeal, Kozina argued that the hearing on the second petition violated due process because the notice allowed only four days from the mailing of the notice until the date members were required to file opposition.  Kozina pointed out that those four days included a weekend.  The court noted that Kozina had no difficulty filing his opposition within the timeframe provided, and was therefore not prejudiced.   However, Kozina argued that other owners were also prejudiced by the timing of the notice.   The court ruled that Kozina did not have standing to assert the due process rights of any other association members.  The court further ruled that a party to a lawsuit may not representthe interests of third persons who are not involved in the case.

First, Kozina argued that he was entitled to represent the interests of the othermembers based on associational standing; however, the court pointed out that the Association is the de facto representative of its members, and Kozina was not claiming to represent any subgroup within the Association.  Rather, he was attempting to assert the rights of members who may or may not have opposed the petition if they were provided with earlier notice.  The court noted that any members who fell into that category could have achieved standing for themselves by moving to vacate the court’s order granting the petition.

Second, Kozina compared his representation of other members’ interests to a shareholder derivative lawsuit.  A derivative lawsuit is one where a shareholder brings a lawsuit on behalf of the corporation when the corporation itself fails to so.  The court rejected this argument on the basis that Kozina was only challenging the court’s order granting the petition – not any act or omission by the Association.

Third, Kozina also challenged the order granting the petition because the trial court failed to make factual findings within the order itself.   The court found that the court’s order granting the petition sufficiently detailed each of the requirements for granting a petition pursuant to Section 1356, and that nothing in Section 1356 required the court to recite the evidence supporting each finding.

Given the number of community associations subject to supermajority approval requirements to amend their CC&Rs, petitions filed pursuant to Section 1356 have become more commonplace.  Due to the contentious nature of these petitions when they are opposed, it is important to be aware of all decisions that may impact an association’s success in obtaining an order to amend its CC&Rs.  Decisions such as Quail Lakes continue to define the legal requirements for petitioning the court for approval of a CC&R amendment.