Tragedy as a Turning Point
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When the Votes Aren’t There, Don’t Despair
Spotlight on Elections
Spotlight on Elections
A Brief Summary of Two Recent California Court of Appeal Decisions
By Mary M. Howell Esq.,CCAL, & Pejman D. Kharrazian, Esq.
Two recent California cases, Takiguchi v. Venetian Condo. Maintenance Corp. and Lake Lindero HOA v. Barone, focus on the ever popular issue of achieving quorum.
Takiguchi v. Venetian Condo. Maintenance Corp.
In Takiguchi v. Venetian Condo. Maintenance Corp. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 880, a small group of owners held multiple units and had controlled the board with its nominees for many years. In January 2021, as the association moved toward its annual meeting to elect directors, there were opposition candidates lined up to change the complexion of the board. The existing board sent out statutorily-prescribed notices of meeting and ballots, and engaged a professional inspector of elections.
Then the fun began. The governing documents prescribed a quorum of 51% of the voting power, with a provision for a lower quorum for an adjourned meeting should the association fail to meet quorum at the initial meeting. The notice of meeting anticipated a failure to achieve quorum, and actually noticed a follow-up meeting to take advantage of the lower quorum requirement for an adjourned meeting. The notice stated that members could participate by mail in ballot, or by attending the meeting virtually, since COVID-19 restrictions were in effect. Ballots were duly mailed to homeowners by the inspector of elections, and the inspector of elections kept a log of which owners had returned their ballots. Ostensibly, to save money and given a long history of failures to achieve quorum, the inspector did not attend the first meeting.
On the date of the first meeting, there was confusion as to whether quorum had been achieved; in determining that quorum had not been met, management relied strictly on the number of written ballots which had been received by the inspector, and did not include persons who attended online.
The failure to count for purposes of quorum those who had not actually cast a written ballot but who appeared via internet did not sit well with the opposition. One homeowner took pictures of the participants who were only appearing virtually. Despite some of those images being identified only by screen names, the opposition was able to persuade the court of the identities of those participating virtually, and counting those as well as the received ballots, it was clear quorum had been achieved at the first meeting.
To compound its problems, the holdover board next voted against holding the (already noticed) subsequent meeting with its lower quorum.
The opposition filed a suit pursuant to Corporations Code Section 7510, which allows a court to order a meeting be held if the corporation’s board had failed or refused to do so. In granting relief to the owners, the court noted that, despite no minutes having been kept, there was sufficient evidence quorum had been achieved at the first meeting. The court accepted the identification of owners who had not submitted a written ballot but participated virtually, and counted those participants toward the quorum. In fashioning its remedy, the court ordered that a new meeting be held for the purpose of counting the ballots which had been received at that first meeting.
A dissenting opinion questioned whether the statute actually supported this type of relief, or whether instead the court should have ordered a new meeting to be held. While the dissent is well reasoned, the remedy prescribed by the court saved the association the not insignificant costs of conducting a second election.
Lake Lindero HOA v. Barone
The second case, Lake Lindero HOA v. Barone (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 834, concerned a recall vote. Defendant was a former director of the association, who had resigned his position in order to take a paid position as the chief executive officer of the association.
Homeowners sought to recall the entire board pursuant to a petition by 5% of the members. Corporations Code Section 7511 requires an association, within 20 days of receipt of such a petition, to notice a member meeting to vote on the issue of recall. The board failed to do so, so the petitioning members sent out their own notice of meeting, and duly conducted the meeting. When this meeting failed to achieve quorum, as prescribed by the association’s bylaws, an adjourned meeting was convened by the same homeowners, resulting in a diminished quorum. The recall was successful, and a new board elected.
Unfortunately, the recalled board refused to leave, contesting the right of the new board to govern, including instructing management to disregard instructions from the new board. The new board and association then filed this suit, asking the court to declare the validity of the recall, and to validate the new board’s termination of Defendant’s contract.
Held: new board 1, old board 0. The trial court’s decision was affirmed on appeal.
The old board made the following arguments: (1) the bylaws required a majority of owners to vote for removal, despite a statute that allowed removal by a majority of a quorum,
(2) the statutes do not permit a reduced quorum, even if the bylaws do, and (3) the Corporations Code only allows a court to determine the validity of “elections”, not “recalls.” The court properly rejected all of these arguments. First, the statute which discusses the percentage vote required for recall (§ 7222) specifically states that it will override any contrary language in bylaws. Second, even though the recall statute doesn’t specifically authorize a lower quorum for adjourned meeting, another statute (§ 7512) specifically provides that bylaws may set a lower quorum for meetings. As to the third point, the court found that Corporations Code Section 7616, which allows a court to validate election results, should be read broadly to permit a court to review recall votes as well.
Takeaways from the two cases:
- Achieving a quorum at annual meetings is always difficult. Keeping an accurate list of ballots cast is essential, and if a virtual meeting is going to play a part in the proceedings, protocols to establish the identity of participants is essential.
- Minutes need to be kept. While the focus is often on board meeting minutes, annual meeting minutes are critical in determining quorum issues, notice issues, motions of adjournment, and the like.
- Any communication between the board, management, and inspectors of election on quorum issues needs to be memorialized in a writing, such as an email.
- Statutes and bylaws need to be read together. In some cases, statutes override contrary language in the bylaws. In other cases, statutes provide that bylaws may differ from the code. A firm knowledge of both the relevant statutes and the association’s specific bylaws (and election rules, though neither case referred to them) is essential in any election, whether the annual election of directors or a recall vote.
- You can’t stop your analysis with the Davis-Stirling Act. Despite the increasingly complex election protections written into the Act, neither of these cases referenced the Davis-Stirling Act. Both were decided entirely by reference to the Corporations Code.
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Must We Sue This Owner?
By Pejman D. Kharrazian, Esq.
A community association board is required to enforce its governing documents against owners. But must a board file a lawsuit if internal enforcement measures fail to gain a recalcitrant owner’s compliance? I often see boards grapple with this difficult decision. The following discussion of California case law explores how directors should decide whether to sue an owner or not and what legal protections are available once that choice is made.
The Business Judgment Rule as a guide and a defense.
In 1977, Beehan v. Lido Isle Community Assn. established that a board may exercise prudent business judgment (i.e., in good faith, in the best interests of the association, and after conducting due diligence) in deciding whether or not to sue over a violation of the governing documents.
But Beehan does not go as far as saying a board can indiscriminately decide not to sue an owner who has violated the governing documents. Instead, it says a decision about whether to sue should be made using the business judgment rule as a guide. The business judgment rule, codified in California Corporations Code section 7231, applies to nonprofit corporations and says:
“A director shall perform the duties of a director . . . in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.”
In following the business judgment rule, a board should, for example: examine the underlying facts, consult with independent legal counsel and other experts to analyze the merits of the potential case, review and follow the governing documents, weigh the costs and benefits of filing a lawsuit versus the nature and magnitude of the owner’s violations, discuss the matter in executive session and memorialize in minutes. A board should also keep in mind the prevailing party attorneys’ fee provisions found in the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act and many CC&Rs—that essentially say, if an association loses the case it could be paying its own attorney and the owner’s attorney!
At the end of the day, if a board’s decision about whether to sue is challenged, the primary defense will likely be the business judgment rule.
Will a court give the board’s decision judicial deference under Lamden?
In 1999, Lamden v. La Jola Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Assn., the California Supreme Court established that when a “duly constituted association board, upon reasonable investigation, in good faith and with regard for the best interests community association and its members, exercises its discretion within the scope of its authority” on how to maintain the common areas, “courts should defer to the board’s authority” (a.k.a., “judicial deference” or the “Lamden rule”). The Lamden rule is analogous to the business judgment rule and is another legal doctrine that affords protection—even if an association is unincorporated.
The court in Haley v. Casa Del Rey Homeowners Assn. recognized Lamden applied to ordinary maintenance decisions. But nonetheless went on to say that Lamden “reasonably stands for the proposition that the Association had discretion to select among means for remedying violations of the CC&R’s without resorting to expensive and time-consuming litigation, and the courts should defer to that discretion.” Haley comes very close and possibly even crosses the line of extending Lamden’s judicial deference standard to a board’s decision about whether to sue.
Haley is not alone in expanding Lamden beyond ordinary maintenance decisions. For example, Dolan-King v. Rancho Santa Fe Assn. granted judicial deference to a board’s architectural decisions; Harvey v. The Landing Homeowners Assn granted judicial deference to a board’s interpretation of the CC&Rs; Watts v. Oak Shores Community Assn. granted judicial deference to a board’s adoption of rules. In taking their broader view of Lamden, Haley, Dolan-King, Harvey, and Watts each quote the seminal California Supreme Court case of Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Association, Inc.:
“Generally, courts will uphold decisions made by the governing board of an owners association so long as they represent good faith efforts to further the purposes of the common interest development, are consistent with the development’s governing documents, and comply with public policy.”
But other cases have tried to limit Lamden: Ritter and Ritter v. Churchill states the Lamden rule protects individual directors from liability, but seems to suggest Lamden will not protect the association (as an entity) from liability for an improper decision.[1] But in Lamden the directors were not parties to the action when the Supreme Court made its decision (only the association was). By that logic, it seems Lamden did apply its judicial deference rule to the association. It therefore, appears Ritter may have gone too far in this regard.
Ritter also reads Lamden narrowly by saying it did not apply to extraordinary (versus ordinary) maintenance decisions by a board, whereas, Haley, Watts, Harvey, and Dolan-King indicate Lamden can apply beyond ordinary maintenance decisions. Ritter seems to be an outlier in this regard.
Further, Affan v. Portofino Cove Homeowners Assn illustrates that Lamden does not apply to decisions of association managers and does not generally apply in situations where no decision is made by the board (inaction versus action).
If future courts are inclined to expand Lamden’s judicial deference rule, then the decision of an association board about whether to sue may be given judicial deference by a court, in addition to the protections provided by the business judgment rule.
[1] Other cases have held an association can remain liable for injury to third parties that flows from improper decisions. (See e.g., Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Assn.; White v. Cox)
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